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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
STATE V. SYED: A DEFENDANT IS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN
COUNSEL FAILS TO INVESTIGATE AN ALIBI WITNESS UNLESS
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THE TESTIMONY
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE VERDICT.
By: Justin Ellis
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that prevailing professional norms
obligated defense counsel to investigate a provided alibi witness and that not
doing so was deficient. State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 96, 204 A.3d 139, 153
(2019). However, the defendant was not prejudiced by this deficiency
because there was not a significant or substantial possibility that a jury would
have reached a different verdict given the potential testimony compared to
the totality of the evidence. Id. 93, 205 A.3d at 158. Additionally, the court
held that the defendant waived his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
by not including the basis in his original petition for post-conviction relief.
Id. at 105, 204 A.3d at 165.
Adnan Syed (“Syed”) was convicted on February 25, 2000, by the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City for the first-degree murder of Hae Min Lee (“Lee”),
as well as other charges. The State’s case comprised of both direct and
circumstantial evidence that focused on the timeline of Syed’s actions on the
day of the murder. Some of the most compelling evidence came from the
testimony of Jay Wilds (“Wilds”) and cell phone tower data. Wilds testified
that on January 13, 1999: Syed had threatened to kill Lee, that he saw Lee
dead in the trunk of her car, that Syed bragged he had strangled her, and that
Wilds assisted Syed to bury the body in Leakin Park. The State then
introduced cell phone tower data that showed Syed’s cell phone in Leakin
Park when it received two calls at 7:09 PM and 7:16 PM, the timeframe Wilds
testified they were burying the body.
While awaiting his initial trial, Syed provided his defense counsel with a
possible alibi witness, Asia McClain (“McClain”). McClain wrote Syed a
letter dated March 1, 1999, offering to help account for his whereabouts on
the day of the murder. The letter stated that she talked to Syed at the
Woodlawn Public Library between 2:30 and 2:40 PM. However, Syed’s
defense counsel failed to investigate McClain’s claim before the trial began.
After his conviction in February 2000, Syed filed a timely direct appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, where the conviction was
affirmed. Ten years later, Syed then filed a petition for post-conviction relief
alleging he had received ineffective counsel, advancing nine bases to support
his claim. A post-conviction hearing occurred in October 2012, that

72

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 50.1

concluded with the court denying relief on January 6, 2014. Syed then filed
a timely application for leave to appeal requesting that the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland remand the case to consider an affidavit from McClain.
The application was granted, and the case was remanded.
At this point, Syed advanced for the first time a claim of ineffective
counsel based on his defense attorney’s failure to challenge cell tower
evidence at trial. At the completion of the hearing, the post-conviction court
held that while Syed’s trial counsel was deficient for not investigating
McClain as an alibi witness, he did not suffer prejudice despite this
deficiency. However, the court held that Syed did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his ineffective counsel claim. Therefore, the court vacated
the convictions and granted a new trial, which the State appealed.
The Court of Special of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the order of the
post-conviction court and agreed that Syed’s defense counsel was deficient
by not investigating McClain as an alibi witness. The Court of Special
Appeals differentiated from the lower court’s holding that the deficiency
prejudiced Syed. Nonetheless, the court held that Syed was precluded from
advancing his ineffective counsel because it was not one of the nine bases in
the original post-conviction petition. The State then filed a petition for writ
of certiorari while Syed filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of
certiorari, both of which were granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
In order to determine if there is a Sixth Amendment violation due to
ineffective counsel, the Court of Appeals applied the two-prong test
established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. Syed, 463 Md.
at 74-75, 204 A.3d at 147. The test requires that the defendant must
demonstrate that their counsel performed deficiently and that the deficient
performance created prejudice. Id. at 75, 204 A.3d 147. The court held that
prevailing professional norms obligated Syed’s defense counsel to
investigate McClain as an alibi witness and not doing so fell below the
reasonable standard of judgment. Id. at 82, 204 A.3d at 152. Subsequently,
the court did not find any evidence to support the premise that not
investigating McClain was a tactical decision or part of the trial strategy. Id.
at 84, 204 A.3d at 153. The State argued that when a record is silent
concerning trial strategy, that deference is given to the attorney and relief
should be denied. Id. at 85, 204 A.3d at 153. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument holding that the inability of Syed’s trial counsel to explain her
trail strategy, due to her death, should not be held against him. Id.
After finding the defense counsel deficient, the Court of Appeals then
examined whether Syed was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Syed,
463 Md. at 86-87, 204 A.3d at 154. When determining if a defendant is
prejudiced, a court will consider whether or not the verdict would have been
different if not for the deficient performance. Id. at 86, 204 A.3d at 154. The
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court found that the possible testimony of McClain would have contradicted
Syed’s statements to police and testimony, impacting his credibility. Id. at
93, 204 A.3d at 158. Further, the court determined the possible testimony
would not have undermined the State’s case consisting of direct and
circumstantial evidence and relying heavily on the testimony of Wilds. Id.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Syed was not
prejudiced by his defense counsel’s deficient performance because, given the
totality of the evidence, the possible testimony from McClain did not provide
a significant or substantial possibility of a different verdict. Id. at 93-94, 204
A.3d at 158.
The Court of Appeals then considered whether Syed knowingly and
intelligently waived his claim of ineffective counsel. Syed, 463 Md. at 97,
204 A.3d at 161. The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”)
provides that if a cognizable claim is not included in the petition for postconviction relief, there is a presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver.
Id. at 98-99, 204 A.3d at 161-62. Syed argued his claim was premised on a
fundamental right, thus requiring an affirmative knowing and intelligent
waiver that is unable to be presumed. Id. at 97, 204 A.3d at 161. The court
disagreed that Syed’s claim was fundamental and affirmed the holding of the
Special Court of Appeals. Id. at 103, 204 A.3d at 164. Accordingly, Syed
was precluded from raising a claim of ineffective counsel for failure to
challenge cell tower evidence due to this presumption. Id. at 105, 204 A.3d
at 165.
The dissent differed from the majority finding that Syed was prejudiced
by deficient counsel. Syed, 463 Md. at 135, 204 A.3d at 183. When the
State’s case is primarily based on a timeline of events, the dissent argued that
any evidence that could break the chain of events, which could also create
reasonable doubt in a juror. Id. at 139, 204 A.3d at 185. Specifically, the
State failed to offer direct evidence to account for Syed’s whereabouts at their
determined time of death for Lee. Id. at 138, 204 A.3d at 184-85. McClain’s
testimony would have placed Syed in a different location from Lee at the
estimated time of her death. Id. at 140, 204 A.3d at 186. The dissent argues
that the jurors not hearing this testimony could have had a significant effect
on their decision. Id. at 141, 204 A.3d at 187. Therefore, the dissent would
have affirmed the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
In State v Syed, the Court of Appeals found that the failure by defense
counsel to investigate a provided alibi witness constitutes a deficient
performance under the definition provided in Strickland. This ruling is
significant because it reinforces the duty of defense attorneys to investigate
all possible alibi witnesses. While it does not specify that every alibi witness
must be interviewed, defense counsel is required to investigate the witnesses.
The holding also affirms permitting only one petition for post-conviction
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relief from a defendant. This draws a comparison to one writ of habeas
corpus at the federal level. Permitting one petition is important for judicial
economy and the efficiency of the courts, as well as having a sense of finality
in criminal cases.

